[For the role of the marabouts as arbitrators in the settling of disputes between tribal groups, see Categories 619 and 792.]

● 648

Libyan Bedouin MT9

[Information on the relationship of the omda and shaikh in their respective roles as district representatives of tribal segments to the Egyptian government will be found in Category 657.]

175 with one move, the Caliph sent these Bedouins into battle in order to enforce authority in his western Berber provinces. This order set in motion the great "Hilali invasion." The tribesmen of Banu Hilal and Banu Sulaim literally slashed their way across eastern North Africa laying waste to towns and fields as they went (Ibn Khaldun 1925:29; Brockelmann 1939: 204).

175 The Arab Bedouins recruited Berbers as they went,
● 648 especially in Libya. Between the years 1052 and 1054, these marauding nomads sacked the rich agricultural lands of Tripolitania and Tunisia, lands which had been in production since the time of the Romans (Mahdi 1964:21). The Banu Sulaim, according to Ibn Khaldun (1925:136), concentrated their action in an area from Alexandria to Tripolitania. It was over this region, which includes Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, that they established their rule. Ibn Khaldun states that the two tribes agreed to divide the conquered territory between them, the eastern lands going to the Banu Sulaim and the western lands to the Banu
175 Hilal (1925:33-34). Such a division of territorial rights in
571 Arab Bedouin society is representative of a set of authority
182 relationships. Differentiation in the locus of authority,
*[613] whether it be horizontal or hierarchical, is a method of maintaining political order among segments of the lineage structure.

175 Evans-Pritchard states that the Cyrenaican Bedouins
114 are descendants of the Banu Sulaim and represent an admixture
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175 eastward toward the Nile Valley. It is not possible to
167 determine the exact conditions associated with this migration, but they probably parallel later movements which are connected with tribal conflicts over land and water rights. In 1689, Bedouins from Libya raided Egyptian oases in the Western Desert (Murray 1935:29). From this date on, for a period of some forty years, records show a continual movement of Bedouins out of Libya into Egypt. Some groups went as far as the Nile Valley and were eventually assimilated into the peasant population there. Tribal movements at the end of the 17th century involved whole tribes and also tribal sections and fragments. Thus in some cases, authority relations arising from territorial bonds were dissipated; but in other cases, political ties were strung across the Libyan Desert from Cyrenaica to the Nile Valley. "Today there is not a Cyrenaican tribe, or even large section, which has not some of its members in Egypt, often whole lineages" (Evans-Pritchard 1954:49-50).

175 Evans-Pritchard's study of the Sanusi, valuable for
619 its analysis of Italian colonial records, shows that the
726 Awlad 'Ali were driven from Cyrenaica by its sister tribe,
167 the Harabi, with the help of the Turkish rulers of Libya.
[648] This took place, he says, about 150 years ago. When the Awlad 'Ali arrived in Egypt, they found the Hanadi tribe already there. In a chain of conflicts, the Hanadi had displaced the Banu'Una, forcing them into the Nile Valley:

175 then came the Awlad 'Ali.
619
726 Around the year 1800, the Awlad 'Ali were able to
167 defeat the Hanadi with the help of another Cyrenaican tribe dwelling in the area, the Jumi'at. The Jumi'at were a vassal tribe who changed their allegiance from the Hanadi to the Awlad 'Ali after this war. The Hanadi, as the Banu'Una before them, were forced into the Nile Valley. Today, they
[131] live in Sharqiyya Province and are no longer distinguishable from the peasant population.

175 According to Evans-Pritchard, the Awlad 'Ali were still
619 in possession of eastern Cyrenaica in 1800. Then there occurred
726 "long and savagely fought" wars ending with the expulsion of
114 the Awlad 'Ali. But this time schedule seems unlikely since the Awlad 'Ali were already at war with the Hanadi when
175 Napoleon landed near Alexandria in 1798. The Bedouin war has
●648 been amusingly described by the French historian Lacroix (in
181 Murray 1935:30) who accompanied the Napoleonic expedition:

> At five o'clock, the first Bedouin were seen on the flank of the army, and shortly afterwards one saw four or five hundred; it was the tribe of Henady, the fiercest Arabs of these deserts. They were almost naked, swarthy, and lean; their horses seemed wornout hacks; save for the helmet, it was Don Quixote as represented in the engravings ...if these five hundred Arabs had been Mamelukes, they would have been able to obtain a great success at this first moment, when the soldiers' imaginations were alert and ready to receive any impression, but these Arabs were as cowardly as the Mamelukes, who had charged an hour before, were brave.

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
•648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
(648) history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
619 viceroy, drove the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

175 territory of the whole Western Desert. They were also
• 648 exempted from land taxes, military duty, and forced labor on
[651] the irrigation projects of the Nile River. In return for these privileges, the Bedouins were expected to guard the frontiers of Egypt and to furnish warriors for the expeditionary forces of Muhammed 'Ali. The Pasha, who was in the process of carving out his own empire independent of the Ottomans, needed warriors, a role which traditionally excluded the fallahin of the Nile Valley. Bedouin horsemen from the Western Desert fought with Muhammad 'Ali in his Wahhabi campaign of 1815 in Arabia. They also aided the Pasha's son, Ismail, in the conquest of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali instituted the practice of granting to the Bedouin leaders land in the rich Nile Valley. He made it explicit that the leaders were to dwell upon this land: their role, as it was officially stated, was to provide a liaison between the Pasha and the tribes. In fact, the leaders were hostages. By controlling them, Muhammad 'Ali was able to exert proper pressure on the Bedouins when and where it was needed (Baer 1957:84-98).

175 Bedouins did not pay land taxes, but neither did they
648 "own" the land; they simply had the right of usufruct. The
651 law stated that only those who paid land taxes had the right
423 to purchase and own their land. But along with ownership of land came the onerous responsibilities of corvée labor on the

175 Nile dikes and military conscription. The term "Bedouin"
• 648 came to mean, as it was defined by the government of Egypt,
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423 one who did not legally own land and hence was not subject to forced labor or military service. On this basis, the Director
[162] of Recruiting Office in a 1904 census distinguished three kinds of Bedouin (Murray 1935:31):

290,095 - settled and living in their own farm colonies
240,880 - living among the fallahin
70,472 - real Bedouin or nomads

601,447

175 By the end of the 19th century, Bedouin society had
177 undergone a great deal of change. Politically, the Bedouins
648 were subordinates in a dominant-subjective authority relationship with the central regime of the Nile Valley. As a result of external political control, nomadism was curtailed and the Bedouins were forced to settle on the land to raise what few crops they could. These new political and economic conditions are the major aspects of the sedentarization process. Bedouin dependence on the central authority of Egypt and their reliance on horticulture increased with time. Nor did the entry of Britain into Egypt in 1882 change the material and social condition of the Bedouin.

175 The British, in the style of the politics of colonial-
648 ism, reorganized the administrative structure of Egypt. The Western Desert was given the status of a province; command

175 posts were established there, and Marsa Matruh became the
648 capital town. The Western Desert was administered by British officers who had under their command a garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Their assignment was to secure the colonial borders. This task included keeping the Awlad 'Ali within the boundaries of Egypt. The policy of the British provincial government was to avoid interfering with the Bedouin process of law and conflict regulation unless it threatened the peace and security
[124] of the desert. My informants said that the British interfered with Bedouin justice only under the threat of large-scale tribal warfare.

175 The political relationship which the Bedouins of the
795 Awlad 'Ali tribe had with the Sanusi Order of Islam in Libya
[619] was historically not so important compared to that of the other Cyrenaican tribes. The Sanusi Order, classified as a Sufi tariiqa ("mystic order"), was actually quite orthodox in its attitudes and practices. This is a function of the socio-religious conditions of its origin during the 18th-19th century revival of orthodoxy in Islamic Arabia (Gibb 1955:
[793] 127-145). Muhammad bin 'Ali al-Sanusi founded his order, al-Sanusiyya, near Mecca around the year 1837. The Sanusi doctrine may be considered orthodox, or secularly oriented, in that it rejects the fundamental goal of Sufism, mystical union with God.

The Sanusi Order, from the very beginning, strove for a return to pure Islam. It made its greatest headway among

175 795 [798] [793] [346] the Bedouins of the Hijaz area. This Sanusi success aroused the jealousy and animosities of the orthodox 'ulama ("clergy") of the Mecca area. Al-Sanusi was forced to flee the Arabian peninsula, and in 1843 he founded his first zawiya ("lodge"), al-zawiya al-baida, in Cyrenaica. The Sanusi doctrine was as acceptable to the Bedouins of Cyrenaica as it had been to the tribes of the Hijaz. The person and teachings of al-Sanusi [793] al-kabir ("the grand Sanusi"), as he came to be known, fit into the "holy man" religious tradition of Cyrenaica and even spread beyond into the Sudan and Lake Chad area. The Order showed primary concern for the people of the desert: the [793] [346] [485] [794] Sanusi shaikh ("holy man") cared for the poor, and the zawiya became rest stops, storehouses, and religious centers where Bedouin children were taught their Quranic lessons. Through 175 795 346 182 [793] the zawiya, the Sanusiyya became a political and economic integrating factor in the desert, and al-Sanusi became the legitimate authority of the Bedouins. The zawiya became a very important part of the traditional desert economic system. Today one zawiya remains near al-Qasr but it is scarcely used. The Bedouins say: "Before, when Alexandria was far away by camel, we could get what we wanted at the zawiya. Now that we have trucks and trains no one goes to the zawiya."

175 795 •648 The fortunes of the Bedouin became linked with those of the Order. When the Sanusi became involved in full-scale conflict with the Italian colonial power, the Bedouins bore

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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the brunt of the war. With Bedouin warriors, the Sanusiyya religious order became a political force for the Italians to reckon with.

From 1911 until the start of the world war in 1914, the Sanusi Bedouin army fought the Italians in the desert and harrassed them in the coastal area. In November, 1914, the Turks entered the war on the side of the Germans, and in May, 1915, Italy joined the Allies. As a result of the declaration of alliances and the expansion of the war, the Sanusi army was sent into Egypt against the British. This move brought the Awlad 'Ali into contact with the Sanusi army. Before this, they had had little involvement in the war. This relative inactivity of the Awlad 'Ali can hardly be explained by the notion that they were "an unwarlike peoples," as Evans-Pritchard (1954:127) has characterized them. The Awlad 'Ali were not in the mainstream of Sanusi war activities in Libya. Also, the British exerted a great deal of control over them in contrast to that which the Italians were able to gain over the Cyrenaican Bedouin.

In 1915, the Sanusi army captured the British Libyan outpost at Sallum, and in January of 1916 they were threatening the town of Marsa Matruh. But within a month's time, by the end of February 1916, the British had routed the Sanusi army, and the following month had retaken Sallum.

During the Marsa Matruh campaign, some of the 'Aishai-

175 795 648 bat from al-Qasr joined the Sanusi army. The importance of their contribution to the Sanusi effort is vague, even though most of my informants claimed that their fathers "fought the British." Some of the al-Qasr activity was on a part-time basis. [124] One informant, whose father was the paramount leader of the 'Aishaibat tribe in 1916, told me that his father "used to take his rifle and ride out every morning to join the troops of Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif (the grandson of al-Sanusi al-kabiir), and there he would kill many British soldiers. Then he would come home again at night." There was at least one group of al-Qasr Bedouins who joined the Sanusi in Libya before the start of the war. After the end of the fighting, this group returned to Egypt and asked to be pardoned by the British. They appealed to the Governor of Marsa Matruh that there should be no reprisals taken against them since the Turks had actually forced them to fight for the Sanusi. The British Governor, who was fluent in the Bedouin dialect and considered a great man by the Bedouins, replied to them in the form of a famous Bedouin proverb: "The ropes can be stretched far enough for forgiveness."

175 177 554 631 648 Traditionally, the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh area were held in check by an officially created political structure which dated from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. This structure depended upon two political roles for the control of the Awlad 'Ali, the 'umda and the shaikh, neither of which had previously existed in the Bedouin authority system.

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•648 Historically, the modern aspect of role differentiation and political specialization began with the appointment of Mitkhatri 'Adam at Sidi Barrani, west of Marsa Matruh. This was under Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The new role was that of 'umda, the same term used for the village leader in the Valley of the Nile. The first Bedouin 'umda died in 1909. At this time, under the British, another political role was instituted. This new role, that of shaikh, was a kind of vice-'umda position. The son of the first shaikh is now about 80 years old [115] and still lives in Marsa Matruh. (He was my chief informant for Bedouin history.) During this early period, there were few government officials in the desert, and, according to my informant, "there was need for only a few 'umdas and shaikhs. But later there was a need for more and more. The job of these men in those times was to work for the Egyptians in their dealings with the Bedouins of the desert." The number of incumbents in the offices of 'umda and shaikh increased as the political needs of the British grew.

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648 According to the Bedouins, the British administration did not arrive in the desert until about 1914. Up until that time, matters were in the hands of the Egyptians who governed the desert province for the colonial government. When the British arrived in Marsa Matruh, the opening of World War I was at hand. The Bedouins say, quite proudly, that the British knew of their sympathy for, and cooperation with, the Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
•648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
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631 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British, they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail, they returned to their positions of political office. While they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
[178] British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of 1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940, that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
175 they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
648 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
722 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
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(556) Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
•648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
556 'Umran Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
166 shaikh of the 'Ali Ahmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time, refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local government and promised him all the help and supplies that he needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
[162] behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000 remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath, the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines left by the advance and retreat of three different armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
648 getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
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1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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729 important effects on contemporary al-Qasr. There remain about 11 million land mines in the ground between Marsa Matruh and Sallum. Accidents connected with these mines take one thousand Bedouin lives every year, and cause about 10,000 injuries annually. (Reported in al-Ahram, January, 1965). This danger limits the areas in which the Bedouins can use the tractor, and, as a result, a great deal of the coastal land must be plowed by hand. In al-Qasr, physical disfigurements resulting from mine mishaps were quite common, and most families have had members killed in this way. In one al-Qasr lineage, 'Ailit Ma'fas, there have been sixteen men killed by mines since 1943.

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Change and Present Attitudes

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177 Political and economic changes, begun at the turn of the century, have continued into the present. The Bedouins of al-Qasr have been increasingly drawn into the political and economic life of the Egyptian national community. They have come to depend upon the national market for their products and upon governmental agricultural subsidies for their security. The net result of this process has been a sedentary Bedouin society which is not quite tribal and not quite peasant. Al-Qasr has this in-between quality--what Fallers (1961) has called the tertium quid quality.

[829] It is difficult to gauge the feelings of the Bedouins of al-Qasr about the social changes taking place. They complain

648 about the lack of concern shown toward the Bedouins throughout
177 the history of their relations with the Nile Valley: they
829 complain that the Egyptians have no right to take over the desert and order their lives for them. They say that "the Egyptians know nothing about the desert"; that "they do not know how to live in the desert and should take our advice on these things." "They (the Egyptians) have given us nothing, we had all of this before they came. Jamal Abd al-Nasser did not invent socialism (ishtarikiyya): the Bedouins have always had it. We have always shared and taken care of one another." The Egyptians are still "outsiders" to the Bedouins. They are referred to as "fallahin" or "peasants."

Interestingly enough, the Bedouins include President Nasser in their own in-group. They insist, in a half-serious way, that he is of the Awlad 'Ali because he is originally from Upper Egypt. One can compare the roles of Nasser and the Grand Sanusi in some ways. Both leaders made special
[778] efforts to bring the Bedouins into a new community, to share their "good fortune" with them; also, both leaders are considered to be possessors of charisma, or baraka ("blessing") by the Bedouins. One may hear unkind remarks about "holy men" or "government officials," but never about Nasser or the al-Sanusi family. One Bedouin said: "Jamal Abd al-Nasser works hard and tries to do good for the people, but his officials are
000 very lazy and do not care about us." While the Bedouins

795 respect the Sanusi family they, nevertheless, wear their
797 religion lightly. An informant, speaking of the merits and
829 demerits of the conservative Muslim Brethern Association, said that "you should never listen to a holy man, for he will lead [576] you straight to hell!" But upon meeting any member of the [778] Sanusi family, all Bedouins greet him by kissing his hand. Besides a show of deference, this ritual act, in theory, transfers baraka from al-Sanusi to the layman.

• 648 The citizenship exemptions granted the Bedouins by
641 Muhammad 'Ali have been rescinded by Abd al-Nasser. This has been one aspect of his program to imbue the Bedouin with political consciousness and promote participation in the nation-state. The Bedouins say that this is the way it should be: they want the right to own land and to accept the responsibility of defending the homeland. But they still do [651] not pay land taxes, and they feel justified in this because the desert "is very poor soil, and not like that of the Nile." Nor do they always heed the call to military duty, though they insist that they do.

648 Egyptian land reform laws would be impractical, or
179 impossible to apply, in al-Qasr. In the Nile Valley, such
423 laws were necessary. The majority of the Egyptian peasants can survive on less than one acre of land, and farms of under five acres comprise 44 per cent of the agricultural land area in the Nile Valley (Warriner 1962:204). Plots this

size in the barley and pasture area of al-Qasr would not permit a subsistence level economy. Just as important is the political implication of any attempt at large-scale land reform in al-Qasr. The pattern of land distribution in al-Qasr reflects an intimate relationship between the structural principles of Bedouin society, especially the lineage system and territoriality. (In a later chapter we will discuss this relationship.) The ramifications of land reform would amount to a structural rearrangement of al-Qasr society and would make redistribution of land difficult to administer, or even to imagine. A reorganization of property relations is, in effect, a basic change in the authority structure. Therefore, the Bedouins want no part of land reform. There is a law which forbids the ownership of "more than 100 feddans (one feddan=one acre) of agricultural land. This shall also apply to barren and desert land."[1] One of my informants, a large landowner, claims that this "law only applies to the Nile Valley where there is plenty of water. If the government wants the Bedouins to abide by that law then they must take care of us. I would gladly trade this land (which was considerably more than 100 feddans) for 100 feddans in the Nile Valley." The traditional tribal structure of Bedouin society

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[1] "Decree for the Amendment of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Southern Region," Department of Information, Cairo, July 25, 1961.

makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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tions and innovations in agriculture which the Egyptians bring to the desert. On the other hand, the Bedouins do not get the modern materials which they need to increase the production of their land. This is most serious when it comes to heavy farm machinery, such as tractors, and the spare parts to keep it functioning. Furthermore, seldom did a man in al-Qasr receive the number of olive seedlings that he requested. This invariably led to bitterness between Bedouins and Egyptians.

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Most of the Bedouins believe that the desert is a difficult (wihsha) life, and they favor change. They want to know, for instance, why an American would leave home to live such a life.

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At a Governor's Council meeting which I attended, the Bedouin representative from al-Qasr did not protest government interference. He complained that the Governor was not furnishing the materials and facilities which the Bedouin needed if he was to become "modern" and "educated." The Bedouins' major complaint about the Egyptians is not that they are trying to change the desert, but that they are not changing it fast enough!

*613 423 182 241 [312] in farming, and he found this land "good for raising mint and vegetables." To the southeast of the 'izba, the lineages of Lazumi and Ma'fas found the land suitable for barley and grazing. This area is rain-fed. There are no wells and so vegetable crops are not possible here. The members of these lineages say that their ancestors were "real" Bedouins in Cyrenaica, and did not wish to become farmers in Egypt. It *613 182 184 241 is interesting to note that the Lazumi and Ma'fas are the richest lineages in all of al-Qasr. They were, perhaps, better able to maintain the traditional style of life which all of the Bedouins claim is "the best." But all Bedouins of al-Qasr depend to some degree upon horticulture or arboriculture. [231] And most families own a few sheep or goats. Both Lazumi and Ma'fas garden in their coastal sections, and Shraif members own sheep.

656 423 Land registration has a history in the Western Desert. The government attempted it a number of times, but with little success until 1959 when the General Desert Development Organization (GDDO) undertook its program of land reclamation. But the 361 342 178 Bedouins were settled long before this. In al-Qasr, the Bedouins began to erect permanent stone dwellings on the land about the time of the First World War. In the Matruh area, elder informants agree that before 1914 the Bedouins lived in tents outside the 361 town area. When the British came, they began to move into town. •648 Many of the Bedouins built houses in Matruh between the years

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
•648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."
361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
178 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
659 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley. Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

423 the structure of both the nomadic and the sedentary tribe:
• 648 "Settlement should take place on the basis of granting each individual capable of working in agriculture a piece of land, the area to be fixed by the state, calculated to ensure the raising of his living standard and to enable him to support himself and his legal dependents on condition that he start cultivation of the land. When distributing the land, care should be taken that a family be settled on a single piece of land composed of the total of the plots granted to its members, the family being composed of relatives to the first grandfather" (Abu-Zeid n.d.).

From this point, each Arab country dealt with the problem of the nomad in its own way, some effectively and others not so effectively. Not until 1958 did Egypt make a formal
423 effort to integrate the Bedouins of the Western Desert into
657 the national society. And it was not until 1960 that the so-
656 called "Desert Law" of 1958 (U.A.R. Law Number 124) was activated and enforced. The most important provision of this law followed the plan formulated at the Baghdad conference: "There is no recognition of tribal possession of land which is considered as belonging to the State, and whenever a family develops and plants on a holding, this gives it the right, if approved, to the issue ot a title to it by the government." Law Number 124 also provided that land occupied by buildings or orchards before 1957 can be owned by the occupants at a low

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
177 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
169 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
• [648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

[619] [675] "Jumi'at, Marabtiin (plural of Marabit) of the 'Ali Ahmar." All Marabit tribes of the Western Desert are affiliated as * [613] clients with Sa'adi tribes. Further, since the tertiary group of the Marabtiin functions in the same way as that of the Sa'adi, it is this group which enters into compacts with Sa'adi tertiary groups. [682] Traditionally, the Marabit group's main support activity was to share in the payment of the blood-money with its Sa'adi protector group. In return, the Marabit group was given land in the protector's territory and could depend upon them to contribute to any Marabit blood debt which might come due. Also, it was considered the [628] [682] duty of the Sa'adi to revenge the death of a member of his client group since the Marabit "was weak and could not face a [608] tribe." But there is no attempt to construct fictional kinship links between Sa'adi and Marabit groups.

[672] In al-Qasr today, contractual relations between Sa'adi and Marabit are still based upon collective responsibility in the blood-feud. However, since this traditional means of conflict control is an extremely rare occurrence, the mutual obligations of the parties are expressed in different forms. • [648] In any conflict between the Bedouins and the Egyptian government, the Marabtiin are expected to support their respective [666] Sa'adi groups. In any modern elections which a Sa'adi might enter, the Marabit is expected to give him his vote. A few examples will make clear the relationship between the Sa'adi

*613 554 69 [671] [178] on paper in triplicate, one copy going to each litigant and a third copy to the chief of police of the Marsa Matruh sector. In practice, though, a copy usually goes to the litigants, but not to the chief of police (who had not a single Bedouin court case in his files).

*613 695 692 [671] As is not the case in Islamic law, in Bedouin customary law the decision of the judge may be appealed. The system of appeals may even function at the level of familial authority, i.e., the son may, in theory, appeal a ruling by his own father. The Bedouins insist that this is an important right of every man. In the situation where a man wishes to appeal a decision of his own 'aqila, he will generally take his claim to another 'aqila of his secondary group. When an appeal is to be made, it is done with the permission of the 'aqila who rendered the original decision. The one who appeals his case does so with the understanding that the decision returned by the court of appeal will be final and binding. Further, if [681] the court of appeal concurs with the findings of the original court, the plaintiff pays a double fine (twice the original fine), and also pays his own 'aqila an expiation fee (kubaara).

69 • 648 [682] [685] The Egyptians have preferred to leave the Bedouins of al-Qasr to settle their own disputes except in the more serious criminal matters. Police from Matruh will enter homicide cases and those conflicts over property rights which threaten to explode into tribal warfare. But these types of conflict have

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•648 been infrequent in al-Qasr. The 'awaaqil of al-Qasr and the police of al-Qasr have an agreement that Bedouin problems are the jurisdiction of the desert leaders, and that the police will intervene only when their help is requested. The Bedouins claim that in the 1930's, the Egyptians tried to do away with Bedouin law but soon discovered their own penal code to be inoperative in the desert. Against "outsiders," the
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69 Bedouin is duty bound to protect his kinsmen, and hence justice could not be satisfied. One 'aqila said that "only the 'awaiyid
*613
682 Awlad 'Ali can maintain order because it stops wars through
182 payment of blood-money." If a Bedouin, for some reason or
692 other, takes his case to the police in Matruh, he will be
648 returned to his 'aqila; he will be told that they can do
*613 nothing for him without the permission of his 'aqila. There are exceptions to this rule which complicate modern Bedouin
692 judicial procedure. For instance, in cases which involve
685 government property, such as olive trees and government-
648 operated water systems, a man may legitimately deal with the
*613 police. In one case in al-Qasr, a man's goats destroyed a number of his neighbor's olive trees. The police decided that the owner of the goats should pay the value of the trees. In another case, a man who had constructed small earth dikes in such a way that rain water was prevented from flowing onto his neighbor's land was forced against his will to remove the obstruction. His neighbor had taken his complaint to the

692 police and not to his 'aqila. This was a serious case because
685 the police were forced to imprison the dike-builder for two
•648 days before he would agree to their demands. The two men in-
*613 volved in the conflict were from different lineages, and it soon became necessary for Bedouin justice to intervene even after the matter had been settled by the police. The 'awaaqil of each man met, along with other notables of the tribe, and investigated the area where the dikes had been; they listened to witnesses and tried to calculate the amount of water which each man should receive. In the end, the decision of the police was upheld.

692 Although, ideally, litigation should be instigated
691 through the office of the 'aqila, alternatives do exist. As
*613 noted in discussing the values of Bedouin society, it is the
[577] moral obligation of each and every person to moderate between conflicting parties; any one conflict situation may be moderated by many well-meaning parties. Or, if a person suspects prejudice on the part of his own 'aqila, he may choose to take
627 his claim to another 'aqila, or third party. The notion of a
554 third party to a conflict, when it does not refer to the 'aqila
692 or a close kinsman who may act as an arbitrator, has reference to a non-institutionalized role in al-Qasr. This role-holder, the Bedouins call rajal khair ("good man") or qawaal al-khair ("the speaker of the good").

"Role differentiation implies organization" (Levy

691 692 *613 554 629 between me and my cousins, according to Bedouin law (yinafth al-'awaiyid bainaana). I went to the shaikh because my cousins did not agree that we go to the 'aqila right away. We agreed that the shaikh would choose the third party, and the judgment would be binding on both of us. The shaikh chose Bu Halaiqa as the third party, and Bu Halaiqa chose three others as consultants. (Two of the three were rajal khair, and the other was an 'aqila.) The judgment was that my cousins were in the wrong. They were fined 10 L.E. and a dhabiiha("blood sacrifice"). 'Ali intervened and did not allow my cousins to pay the fine. He had them write a paper stating, that if they resume this quarrel in the future they must pay the fine plus another 10 L.E. fine. (Hajj 'Ali is a rajal khair.)

695 *648 696 Sometimes the Egyptian police must be brought into a judicial affair to insure the execution of a judgment. In one case, an individual in al-Qasr did not accept the decision of his 'aqila; his 'aqila wrote the decision on paper and sent him to another 'aqila. The second 'aqila agreed with the first, but the man also refused this decision. The second 'aqila wrote his decision on paper and sent it to the shaikh of the 'Aishaibat in Matruh. The shaikh summoned the culprit and sent him to the police station. Finally, the police were able to convince the man to pay his fine, and also his expiation fee to his own 'aqila. My informant said that this was a minor affair, and that had it been a serious offense committed by the man he would have been threatened with expulsion from the corporate group.

*613 554 571 As the corporate sole, the 'aqila has political authority which is legitimate and morally binding on all who wish to maintain their status in the group and tribe. Any individual

for legal interpretation. For instance: "We are also told by Yahya that (the Caliph) Mu'awiya ibn Sufian said that a wound on the body should be assessed at half the value of that wound on the head or face" (1935:324). Maliki law, derived in large part from the Bedouin traditions of Arabia, may be seen to characterize the legal norms of the tribal-based social structure in the Western Desert. The Bedouins of al-Qasr themselves claim that they are within the bounds of Islamic Law when they deny the female the right to inherit, though they do have other, and more secular, justifications for the practice.

As we have already noted, in the above quote from the "holy man" of al-Qasr, the Bedouins feel that the 'awaiyid can succeed where governmental law will fail. They say that "the government does not understand the problems of the Bedouins," that "government troops cannot function in the desert." They feel that they need the 'awaiyid for the sake of political order itself: "If the Bedouins did not have the 'awaiyid, they would eat each other. The 'awaiyid is so important that a man who commits a wrong in town will lie to the government, and then dutifully return to the tribe for Bedouin justice."

In 1933, the government "abolished" the 'awaiyid and insisted that the Bedouins settle their difference in the civil courts in accord with Egyptian law. According to

671 the Bedouins, the government soon discovered their own error,
182 for they were unable to effectively manage group and tribal
•648 political relations: "They (the government) found out that they could not solve murders in the desert. They would arrest the killer but the trouble continued between families (i.e. feuding went on). There were more killings instead of less, and, finally, the government asked us to return to the 'awaiyid because it alone can solve murders in the desert." I was unable to document the claim that the government had "abolished" the 'awaiyid in 1933, but a number of officials who worked at the Governor's Office in Marsa Matruh said that it was true.

671 In al-Qasr, and in the Western Desert in general,
641 adherence to law and political order rests upon the conviction
579 that each individual and territorial group have guaranteed
571 rights which are related to honor and property. A violation
554 of any single man's honor or property may easily be interpreted, according to the principle of collective responsibility, as an offense against the rights of a group. And in this sense, legal and moral violations in Bedouin society are relative to the structure of interrelations, and they must be regulated with reference to the various levels of the authority structure.

181 Bedouins place a high value on political order, but
641 also on the idea that political order can only be guaranteed
578 through a man's willingness "not to allow another to take any
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671 They said that if a man 206
562 insisted on keeping a promiscuous wife, his family would
684 "write a barawwa aginst him." I heard of no sex offenses in
681 al-Qasr while I was there.
[114]

671 The penalty for stealing, according to the 'awaiyid,
685 is that the thief shall pay compensation, by himself, in the
amount of four times the value of the stolen object. On the
* [613] other hand, if the thief is a poor man, he will pay thrice the
value of the stolen object and the remaining fourth will be
paid by his lineage.

671 The 'awaiyid recognizes the territorial claims of the
685 lineage. Disputes arising over conflicting claims to land
*613 and wells are handled at Bedouin courts in much the same way
578 as personal injury cases are, with one exception. Usually, a
[554] larger number of elders and rajal khair will be consulted in
an advisory capacity by the 'awaaqil handling the case. The
'awaaqil consider the specific history of a particular piece
of land or well (for instance, each well is known by its own
name), and determine the ownership in accordance with the
testimony of elders and individuals of high social status.
Most of the problems over land and water rights in al-Qasr
have reference to what is still considered lineage-owned
685 territory in the barley-and-pasture sector. In the 'izba
578 sector, conflict over land ownership rights, since they are
• 648 rights which are registered with the government, is settled
in the Egyptian court of law. Only one such case came up while

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
578 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
•648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle their own land disputes because the government's way of handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
*613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593 level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
596] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila. On the other hand, the 'aqila, as a legitimate representative of his authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict regulation falling within the sphere of external political relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal segments.

The 'aqila as the most effective mechanism of social
*613 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
578 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
182 group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

*613 578 619 681 cases of homicide and one case of wounding) one was at the tribal level; three at the primary level; three at the secondary level; and two at the tertiary level. Of the thirteen cases dealing with property rights over land, water, or women, none took place at the tribal level; four were at the primary level; seven at the secondary level; and one at the tertiary level. One case dealing with marriage rights took place within a tertiary segment and concerned the legitimacy of a man to claim his bint 'amm. Twelve of the twenty-two cases occurred within the 'Aishabat tribe. Of the ten cases of conflict involving units from outside the 'Aishaibat, six cases were between primary units, three cases were between secondary units, and one case involved the 'Ali Ahmar with the Harabi of Libya.

In almost every case involving primary units and tribal units, the two opposing authority groups were actually secondary groups who had the backing of their primary groupings. The case in which the 'Ali Ahmar mobilized to deal with a problem in Libya probably represents an atypical case in history. It is unlikely that tribal groups of this size [648] could mobilize in time of war or peace, and in this particular case the good international relations of Egypt and Libya were at stake.

784 695 681 There is another realm of sanctions which can be invoked in cases concerning homicide, wounding, theft, and

577 According to this 'aqila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal political system do differ from those applied in the external political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
68 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be characterized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'aqila involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:
692 842 * [613] [627] • [648]

first, the government may enter into conflict cases which are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or external political relations, have the right to take their case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal processes of social control in al-Qasr: the first case rarely happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently but no recordings of the settlement are made.

Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as opposed to a law of public delicts:

> In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some other person or body of persons within the community to be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction frequently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus expressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

what happened; some of them are my translations of legal documents which informants permitted me to see; a few of the cases happened while I was in the field and represent my reporting of what happened. I have arbitrarily divided the cases into those involving personal injury and those concerning property rights. In each case, I indicate at which level of the authority structure the conflict and settlement has taken place.

Legal Cases Pertaining to Personal Injury

Two cases of killing have been discussed previously. Below are a number of cases dealing with personal injury which occurred in the external political system at the various levels of segmentation. The first three cases involve conflict between secondary lineage segments of the 'Aishaibat tribe; the next two cases take place at the primary and sub-tribal levels, but note that secondary segments are the actual functioning units involved; the final case, an unusual one, deals with conflict with "foreigners" at the tribal level. Note that the 'aqila as a corporate representative is active in these cases. The third case presented below is a translation of an actual document showing how the nazaala (discussed above) functions as a formal mechanism of conflict regulation.

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that they had received their rights in this case. And the two parties are satisfied by this according to the witnesses present.

Signatures or seals of four witnesses.

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The next case represents the only time in the memory of informants that all of the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar met to intervene in a case of conflict. This case is extremely unusual because it may be the only time in Awlad 'Ali history that political mobilization of this scale has taken place. As noted, political action, in war or peace, usually involves only secondary segments. In view of this, the case probably reflects an instance of social change: the Egyptian government, anxious to maintain good relations with Libya, encouraged and facilitated the settlement of this dispute by furnishing transportation and cutting administrative red tape so that the 'awaaqil of the 'Ali Ahmar could handle this case in a most expeditious way. Here is a case where Bedouin traditional political structures function adequately in the modern situation. Note here also that, in certain circumstances, the diiya payment can be divided symbolically and specifically to place guilt and to indicate the seriousness of a crime.

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Date: 1963. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of 'Ali Ahmar (Egypt) and the Harabi (Libya) concerning murder. A young boy of 'Ailit X was visiting his sister in Libya. He learned

423 619 578 691 (nizā'a) belongs to Khalid Idris and his brothers. This happened with the satisfaction of both tribes, and this renunciation of claim is valid from today. This paper concerning the ownership of land around the well is valid from today also. And this happened between the parties: (Signatures or stamps of both parties concerned.)

(There appeared the signatures of twenty-three of the twenty-four men who were to have sworn the oath.)

Only twenty-three oath-takers were present: 30 July 1964. I, Shaikh Khalid Za'aluk, agree on the signatures of only twenty-three oath-takers. (Signature of Khalid Za'aluk.)

• 648 671 578 We have mentioned that the 'awaiyid prevails in al-Qasr, but have also noted that where the security of the desert is threatened the government is likely to intervene. The government enters tribal conflict in al-Qasr with the tacit approval of the Bedouins. As one informant remarked: "The 'awaiyid is the best way to handle problems, but the police will handle what the 'awaiyid cannot."

423 691 578 619 648 * [613] [634] Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between al-Afrad ('Ali Abyad) and 'Aishaibat ('Ali Ahmar) over water rights. Many members of both tribes took part in this conflict. The government had to intervene: they formed a peace committee made up of all the 'awaaqil of both tribes and the 'umda and shaikh from each tribe.

423 each tribe. It was decided that the water which flows through
691 the wadi after the rains should be divided equally between the
578 two tribes, and that no one should be stopped from using the
619 water. Had not the government intervened in this conflict,
•648 and had not they collected all of the weapons from the Bedouins, this problem would have resulted in the death of many men and even greater problems.

674 Theft is condemned by the Bedouins: "Everything in
685 the desert is loose. We must punish the thief quickly and severely." It is a fact that the man who goes to steal and
[682] accidentally kills in the act will have judged against him
[829] the full diiya, i.e., the amount for intentional killing. On the other hand, the people of al-Qasr insist that "Bedouins do
[671] not steal." But legal norms exist to sanction violations against cultural ideals. The following case shows how social and ritual sanctions operate to enforce ideals.

619 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between the tribe of Kamailat and
578 the tribe of 'Aishaibat over the theft of 16 L.E. Muhammad of
685 'Ailit Ma'fas was accused of stealing 16 L.E. which belonged
*613 to Ahmad of 'Ailit Idris, Kamailat. The theft occurred while the two were residing at a hotel in Marsa Matruh. There were twenty other persons in the hotel that night. The accused said: "I did not take anything."

*613 must come because he, himself, was a Libyan and a member of
619 no tribe in Egypt. Al-Sanusi's petition was two-fold: he
578 said the cousin should be punished for violating his right of
582 privacy and property, and the question concerning the cousin's
793 right to the girl should be settled. The 'awaaqil decided
683 that al-Sanusi should be awarded a kubaara of 1000 L.E. from
692 the tribes of the area, and that the girl should be permitted to marry no man of the Qinaishat tribe. Al-Sanusi refused to accept the kubaara, and this was the correct thing to do since the kubaara, especially a large one, is only offered ritualistically. The 'awaaqil took note of the cousin's rights to his bint 'amm: they said that since the girl refused to marry him it would not be right if she married anyone else from the tribe.
*613 Furthermore, the 'awaaqil, on the basis of the cousin's behavior
619 in this matter, decided that the cousin was insane and should
734 be committed to an asylum. They informed the police in Marsa
[648] Matruh of this diagnosis and decision, and the police came and transported the boy to the mental hospital in Cairo where he is today. The uncles of the boy signed the papers which committed him.

554 you for your cloak, you would have immediately given it to
178 him. God was pleased with them at that time."
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This notion of changing foci of authority and power cannot be divorced from the related political phenomena of the tendency toward legitimacy and the role institutionalization
128 process. In the next chapter, I will attempt to show how such a conceptual framework can be utilized in an analysis of culture and political change.

Modern Legal Roles

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The roles of 'umda and shaikh were created and imposed upon the Bedouins by Muhammad 'Ali sometime during the early part of the nineteenth century in order to facilitate administration, maintain security in the desert, and protect the Western frontier.

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Both of these roles are representative offices at the primary level of the tribal structure. The 'Aishaibat have an 'umda and a shaikh who reside in Marsa Matruh and work in close relation with the Governor. In terms of a chain of command, these offices receive demands which may originate either with the Governor in Matruh or with Bedouins in al-Qasr. But these offices are subservient to both the Governor and the Bedouins since no decision-making powers of any consequence resides with them. With reference to the two authority structures, the Egyptian and the Bedouin, the 'umda and the

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structured situation the traditional authority structure would have disappeared from the scene.

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But, there is a struggle for authority recognition going on in al-Qasr. It is related to the change from the old basis of traditional authority to a new basis of legal authority. At the heart of this struggle is the role of the rajal khair. The rajal khair has a firm public basis for establishing himself in an authoritative and representative role. Traditionally, the rajal khair has faced inward and outward: he has used his ascribed position on the al-Qasr prestige scale to augment his status and influence, and, at the same time, his economic rationality has oriented him toward Marsa Matruh. In the present stage of culture change, the rajal khair is in a position to combine his ascribed and achieved attributes to gain entrance to a new reference group, the Egyptian bureaucracy. This offers him a new kind of prestige as well as affording him new opportunities for power, and even authority, over his fellow Bedouins.

•[648]

The rajal khair, in view of his movement between the old and new in Egypt, maintains a tertium quid status in two camps. While he has one foot in the traditional community because of his role in conflict regulation and the manipulation of traditional values, the rajal khair also has a foot in the

He was sometimes asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four), Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila was present to sign and validate this document.

Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr. But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foothold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this to "control the Bedouin" and to "get the men out of the tents." He explained in his own way what he considered to be the structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that

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Hajj 'Ali "became an 'aqila by his way of life." Of course, the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an 'aqila at all. Although I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali was the 'aqila of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore, and most impressive of all, one 'aqila in 'Ailit Dawlat and his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the 'aqila of Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest on the part of the Dawlat 'aqila. There is good reason for these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key traditional "authority," or spokesman for his corporate group. It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative capacity. The 'aqila who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an 'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived outside the 'izba sector and hence mistook an important rajal khair for an 'aqila. The Governor understandably mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an 'aqila.

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There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council (Majlis al-Muhafza) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives
•[648] of the Egyptian government employees working in the province.
[634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need not be an 'umda or a shaikh, although they may be. The oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an 'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels understand the problems of the people."

635 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on
124 his council is an 'aqila. He replied to my question about
*613 the criteria for membership on the Majlis al-Muhafza: "I am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the 'umda or shaikh, I choose the 'aqila. Every man on the council is an 'aqila, and the number is determined by the population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the
[619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes. This is because they are more numerous, and they are near Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The 'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes by just three men."

156 Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member
159 of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and ob-
554 served the December meeting of the Council. The Governor
635 sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representa-
648 tives on either side of him. At the other end of the table
[114] sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
• 648 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[871] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
[591] He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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635

121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
• [648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
829 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
178 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
177 Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
• [648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
177

156 imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at
159 the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali
554 realizes his marginal position between the new and the old,
178 and his attitude concerning change through education seems
177 to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on
156 the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of
159 the psychological aspects underlying social change:
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> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

156 As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it
159 is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community
554 are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins.
829 This is indicated by the following event. One month before
574 I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was
•648 expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr
was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj
'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
• 648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

619 173 Until two centuries ago Awlad Ali lived in eastern Cyrenaica. After the death of Aqqar, his two sons, Ali (founder of Awlad Ali) and Harb (founder of Harabi tribe on chart), competed for the leadership of 619 173 726 the tribe. This competition involved their respective tribes in a bitter war which existed for more than fifty years. In one of the major battles between the two tribal segments, the Harabi segment with help [648] from the Caramanli rules of Tripoli were able to defeat Awlad Ali and to drive them eastward across the Libyan-Egyptian borders into the Egyptian Western Desert. This happened about 150 years ago. At that time, the area was occupied by the Hanadi, a warlike cousin of Awlad Ali, who had established a system of dominance over the Murabiteen tribes who are believed to be the original inhabitants of the desert. The area also was inhabited by the Gemeiat tribe, which, although believed to have Murabiteen status, yet were not treated as clients of the powerful Hanadi, as were the other Murabiteen tribes in the area. With the help from the Murabiteen, Awlad Ali were able to defeat the Hanadi and to drive them eastward into the Nile Delta, where they settle now as cultivators.

619 175 648 During the rule of Muhammad Ali (1815-1848), the warlike Awlad Ali were frequently used by the government to subdue the tribal uprisings in the Delta and other parts of Egypt, and to hold the Mamlukes in check. There was no organized army in Egypt at that time except for a few remnants of the Turkish soldiers. The tribal population of Awlad Ali agreed to supply Muhammad Ali with fighting men on the condition that they would be provided with food and arms and also exempted

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[619] [173] connection to Gemeiat and insist that they are a Murabiteen tribe who acquired their relatively higher status through their assistance to Awlad Ali during their fight with the Harabi.

619 from forced labor in government projects and released from the pay-
175 ment of taxes. The government agreed to these demands, and on their
• 648 part, Awlad Ali helped Muhammad Ali extensively in his military expe-
dition in Syria and Arabia and were a major factor in the battle of
1815 at Bissel where he succeeded in breaking Wahabi power. They also
helped his son, Ismeal, in his expedition to the Sudan.

[701] Later, when the Egyptian army was organized, the government ex-
empted Awlad Ali and other tribal groups which helped in the military
conquests from military service, but required them to undertake the
guarding of the desert roads and the frontiers of Egypt. Also, in
[423] exchange for their previous services, they were given the right to use
the land of the Western Desert and left the question of its distribu-
tion among the various tribal segments to the native tribal leaders.
619 Finally, in 1832, Awlad Ali were granted a form of legal and political
175 autonomy whereby the government acknowledged the tribal legal and
648
642 judicial system as the means to settle disputes between members of the
tribe. The government also recognized the authority of the native tribal
leaders and allowed the tribal populations to be governed by their own
native system of leadership.

This political autonomy of Awlad Ali existed until 1947. Although
their usefulness to the government had long ceased to exist, they had
continued to enjoy the privileges they had obtained earlier. This was
partly due to the fact that the various governments that came after
Muhammad Ali showed no interest in the area occupied by Awlad Ali.
There were no taxable lands in the area, no natural resources of any
promise, and the tribal population did not present any particular prob-
000 lem to attract the attention of the government. There was some smuggling

There was some smuggling of goods across the Libyan border, but this smuggling was done on a very small scale. Before the Egyptian government imposed restrictions on imports, the prices of the goods in the Libyan market were close to their prices on the Egyptian market. Except for a very few items which were not found on the Egyptian market, smuggling goods from Libya offered a very limited financial gain to the smugglers. In recent years, this situation has changed, however. With population increase in Egypt threatening disaster, and with the cultivable land in the valley reaching its maximum productivity, the attention of the government was drawn to the fertile yet dry land of the northern strip of the Western Desert as a possible means of expanding the cultivated area. A number of projects are taking place at the present time under the land reclamation act. The most important of these projects is the Eastern Mariut project which is directed toward the irrigation of the lands of the Western Desert through the channelling of the flood waters of the Nile into a network of canals covering an extensive area of the northern strip of the Western Desert. Also, recently, oil has been discovered in the area, and since the end of the Second World War, the area has been a major attraction for tourists.

More important is the increase in traffic of smuggled goods from Libya. Custom restrictions on imported goods to Egypt have created a scarcity of American and British manufactured goods which raised their price on the Egyptian market and made smuggling a profitable activity. An opposite-direction smuggling of sheep and goats from Egypt to Libya created a great shortage in the Egyptian meat market. Before the discovery of oil in Libya, the Western Desert area supplied the Egyptian

795 Because of their religious position which put
195 them outside the tribal structure, the leaders of the zawyas played a
627 significant role in mediation and settling disputes between various tri-
793 bal segments. At their disposal was their ability to ostracize anyone
[626] who did not abide by their decision from the zawyas, which meant depriv-
ing him from all the benefits, social as well as religious, that member-
ship in the zawyas offered.

795 After the First World War when the British replaced the Turks as
195 governors of the area, the zawyas were closed and the religious leaders
177 ordered to leave. The zoning established by the zawyas existed, however,
[648] and was used as the basis for the redistricting of the area. Police
[631] stations replaced the religious centers. From the standpoint of the tri-
[625] bal population itself, the districts have no psychological or political
619 reality. The zawyas were originally established in the areas of tribal
634 concentrations. But the area itself did not have any political identity.
[795] The only reality from the standpoint of the inhabitants was the tribal
[361] reality and affiliation which cut across many of these districts. Many
of the tribal segments inhabiting one district were and still are hostile
177 to one another. To transform the zones into administrative districts and
634 to establish one office of leadership for the whole district was to im-
619 pose a political unity nonexistent among the tribal segments inhabiting
[622] the district. To avoid this difficulty, the government supplemented the
territorial principle of the omda system in the rural area with the prin-
ciple of tribal representation and came up with a system which seems to
suite the situation in the Western Desert. For each of the districts,
a list of all tribal segments which habitually occupy the area and whose
tribal land is located within the district, is made. The most powerful

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[For information on the relationship of the Sanusi Order with other foreign powers, notably the Turkish and Italian governments, see Category 116, pp. 14-15, 22-23, 26-28, 37, 43-46, 50, 60-61, 63, 69-71, 83-84, 87, and 90-229.]

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

*795 [793] into the Order ordinary members. This is done simply by the two persons concerned shaking hands and reciting the *fatiha*, the opening verse of the Koran, together. These categories can hardly be regarded as grades and I can cite the authority of Sayyid Muhammad Idris to support the opinion that they have never meant more than that some persons were recognized as more learned than others and therefore better qualified to recite the longer and more advanced religious exercises.

II

*795 793 The Grand Sanusi's desire to create around him a society living the life of primitive Islam and his missionary zeal gave an impression, enhanced by the austerity of his Bedouin followers and the remoteness of the Sahara, of excessive puritanism and fanaticism; and some writers have compared the Sanusi movement to the Wahhabi movement on account of these supposed traits. Duveyrier's account,[1] used very uncritically by other writers, is largely to be blamed for the exaggerated stories of the secrecy, puritanism, fanaticism, power, and numbers of the Order that were current at the end of the last century and in the first decade of the present century and which much prejudiced it in the eyes of European Powers with interests in North Africa. With Duveyrier it was an axiom that any foolhardy European who got himself killed in North and Central Africa had been assassinated by Sanusi agents and that any setback to French interests was due to their propaganda.

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*795 793 784 114 [273] [276] [279] It is true that the Grand Sanusi, like the founder of the Wahhabi movement, aimed at restoring what he conceived to be the original society of the Prophet. Neither was peculiar in doing so, for every Muslim preacher must have the same aim. The Grand Sanusi forbad the drinking of alcohol and the taking of snuff and at first, though not absolutely, smoking. But all Muslims are forbidden alcohol and many who are neither Sanusi nor Wahhabi think that smoking is best avoided. It is untrue, as has been asserted, that the Sanusi are forbidden coffee. The Bedouin of Libya do not drink coffee, only tea, in

[1] H. Duveyrier, *La Confrérie Musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben 'Alî es Senoûsî et son Domaine géographique en l'Année 1300 de l'Hégire = 1883 de notre ère*, 1884.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
(1837-1942) Sanusi

175 648 [167]

first caused misgivings in Rome and afterwards led to the destruction of the Italian armies in North Africa and their ejection from the continent. A sullen Arab population in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and a hostile Arab and Muslim world were, in view of the coming storm, so clearly contrary to Italian interests that a more conciliatory policy, at any rate in words, was adopted and Balbo was entrusted with the difficult task of putting it in effect against a background of slaughter and repression. Once again the Italians had waited too long.

III

The ups and downs of Italian fortunes in Cyrenaica and in the world are reflected in the various decrees which defined the juridical status of the Arabs. In giving a brief account of these decrees it must be kept in mind that whilst they referred to the whole Arab population they really affected only the Arabs of the towns, and even in the towns only those few persons, mostly officials, who actively collaborated with the Italians; and that till 1932 the Italians had no certain or complete control outside the towns.

175 648 641

At the beginning of the first Italo-Sanusi war the Arabs were in law Turkish subjects. By a Royal Decree of 5 November 1911, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were declared to be under the full sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. The status of the Cyrenaican Arabs was fixed by the Royal Decree of 6 April 1913, which declared all born in the country, wherever resident, to be *sudditi italiani*, provided they were not Italian citizens or foreign citizens or subjects. They retained their Muslim personal law, but were subject in other respects to whatever regulations the Italians saw fit to impose on them. They were permitted to hold posts in the armed forces and administration of the colony, and persons desirous of acquiring Italian citizenship might apply for it if they possessed residential qualifications, though by taking it they became subject to Italian personal law. These early decrees were more in the nature of administrative than constitutional law. A constitution, in the continental sense, was promulgated in 1919 after the Italians had signed a truce with the Sanusi.

The agreements entered into with the Sanusi between 1917

drought giving insufficient pastures and poor crops. Good or bad crops, poor or abundant pasture, in turn mean a higher or lower milk yield from the animals and better or worse living conditions for human beings. Such factors as these may well, over a number of years, lead to unevenness in the distribution of population throughout the tertiary sections. Whatever the cause, the genealogies show that the population of the numerous tertiary sections is unequal. Some are numerically so weak that they have to join a collateral section. Others are numerically so strong that their natural resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all their members. It was these latter segments which were in the process of splitting, and which in some cases have already done so. The next task, then, is to demonstrate where, on the genealogy, proliferation is effected.

We have seen that in Nuer genealogies segments proliferate at all orders of segmentation. Here, the process is a continuous one, beginning at any point in time within the minimal lineage and progressing upwards to the apex of lineage bifurcation. As particular names become significant within the minimal segment, they are retained and become a permanent addition to the genealogy. In order to include these successively additional names, names of ascending ancestors are shunted further and further into the genealogical past, until presumably the effect is felt at the topmost limit of the genealogy, when the names here are pushed out of the genealogical framework altogether, and forgotten for ever. More than this, the upward shift in names at each and every point in the genealogical line means also a consequent re-ordering of structural relationships, at all levels in the system. One vital difference between Nuer and Bedouin societies which may partly, at least, account for the different genealogical processes at work among them is that the Nuer, when they were studied by Evans-Pritchard, were expanding territorially, and that continuous proliferation of segments throughout the structure was the mode of dealing with a situation of expansion. The Bedouin, on the other hand, had suffered twenty years of terrible privation at the hands of the Italians, during which period thousands of them died in battle and in concentration camps, were shot up in their camps from the air, or died from want, before I went to live among them. Although I must confess that I now

4: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1970 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

days on which kin of various sorts should attend the mourning ceremonies, which extend over a period of a week. Allowance is made for those who may be away temporarily, although they are expected to hasten to the mourning camp as quickly as possible. Agnatic kin are expected not only to be present on the appropriate day, but are required to offer gifts consistent with their relationship to the bereaved; agnates of the tertiary segment are expected to offer a sheep, while some cognates ought to bring a goat and others a quantity of sugar and tea. At one funeral in a camp where I was resident, soon after the death occurred, the main concern of its inhabitants was whether or not certain men of their section would attend the mourning rites and bring appropriate gifts with them. These men lived at the time in another camp a few miles away, as they had been doing for several years past. They did not come when they were expected, and when they finally arrived at the end of the week they brought with them gifts of sugar and tea only—gifts which were totally inappropriate for agnates of the group. They were, in fact, now no longer members of it, and my neighbours were able to tell me, 'They have branched off from us. We will never live together again.' The lineage had proliferated and this was the first occasion for showing it.

Wide-spread in Cyrenaica is a cult of saints. The number of saints' tombs varies from tribe to tribe, there being fewer among the camel herders of the semi-desert than among the cow-herding, almost sedentary, folk of the plateau area. Whatever the number, the members of the group that venerates a particular saint make an annual pilgrimage to his tomb, and sometimes more frequent pilgrimages are made. In one area there were two men, accepted by their respective kin groups as leaders, who vied against each other for the leadership of their section. One of them had been a famous warrior during the Italian wars and, after being injured, fled to Egypt where he lived for seventeen years, until he returned to his homeland in 1947. The other had also fought against the Italians, failed to win renown, was a captive for a time, later released, and subsequently appointed leader of his section by the Italian authorities. The first, during his period of exile, had become impoverished. The second during his years of freedom had prospered. As far as their personalities

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
[173] some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
602 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
121 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
619 relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
571 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
121 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
619 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
613 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
554 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
[682] secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
[114] when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
571 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
[114] see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose. It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
[648] It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
[628] witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order established itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.[1] The lodges served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo-Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral-agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.[2] Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

[1] Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

[2] Leach, 1961, p. 6.

8: Kennett G-5 (ca. 1921) 1925 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9

682 time the case was re-opened, after a further interval of some
672 years since the second judgment. By this time nearly all
695 the assessors and witnesses of the first Court were dead,
694 rumours had been spread that the gun belonged to a stranger who had left his gun in Korayem's tent, and should therefore pay his share of the bloodmoney, and so on.

The Gereidat family again succeeded in confusing the case, and in prejudicing the issue in their favour; and the third court gave the following decision, to the disgust of interested followers of this rather remarkable lawsuit. They decided that no evidence existed to shew what happened in Korayem's tent, and that no oath was necessary, maintaining that in the absence of any proof whatsoever Farag had no claim. They further ordered a new distribution of the reduced scale of bloodmoney proposed, whereupon the proceedings became completely involved and absolutely unintelligible.

682 The above events point out unmistakably the weak
672 spots in the Ourfi system. Korayem's family were strong,
695 and on two occasions were successful in evading just decisions against them; while the weak family with a strong case had to see justice perverted.

695 When the considered judgment of an Ourfi Court
182 receives authority for prompt and immediate execution from the Government and the police, the Ourfi system is
• 648 probably the nearest possible approach to the ideal, consistent with the conditions prevailing. But it is an undeniable fact, which must be faced, that without the moral backing of the Civil Power behind the judgments of the Bedouin Courts, miscarriages of justice are possible, and do actually take place.

9: Murray E.K-3,4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Egypt

ancestress of the Awlad 'Ali and Hind of the Hanadi. (The Hanadi call their ancestress Hind, the daughter of Sallam.) These obvious fabrications only mean that their conventional genealogy is not believed outside the tribe. But the Awlad 'Ali themselves all agree that 'Ali was the son of 'Aqar bin Dib.

They are now a composite tribe made up of the descendants of 'Ali's three sons, and various fragments of broken tribes. The Awlad 'Ali lived for a long time in the "Green Mountain" of Cyrenaica, and about 150 years ago began to drift eastwards, called into Egypt by the Jumei'at to aid them against the Hanadi, who, with their subtribes, were then in possession not only of the north coast but were also settled all over the Beheira.

After the departure of the French in 1801, a firman was addressed to the sheikhs of the Hanadi, Afrad (a division of the Awlad 'Ali), Jumei'at, Beni 'Una, and other Arabs resident in Beheira, confirming them in their territories, but threatening them with expulsion and fine if they misbehaved themselves.[1]

By 1808, the Hanadi seem to have been quite driven out by the Awlad 'Ali, for in that year they bought their peace with Muhammad 'Ali and asked for the restitution of their lands in Beheira. The Pasha agreed to this and sent troops under Shahin Bey to chase the Awlad 'Ali out again. The Awlad 'Ali responded by offering 100,000 "tallaris" to be allowed to remain in the lands of the Hanadi—an offer which Muhammad Ali accepted. When they failed to pay up, troops were again sent to aid the Hanadi against them, but this combined force was completely defeated by the Awlad 'Ali near Hosh 'Isa.[2]

Of the events of 1810, Jabarti says :

> "During his stay at Alexandria, he (Muhammad Ali) gave safe conduct to the chiefs of the Bedouins of the tribe of Awlad Ali who lived in the province of Beheira, and by this ruse enticed them to him ; but hardly had they arrived than he had them arrested, claimed large sums from them, and sent his soldiers to carry off their cattle ; their wives and their children were dishonoured. He then gave them robes of honour."[3]

Finally he exiled the Hanadi to Sharqiya, then a desert, and gave the Awlad 'Ali their lands on the coast and in Beheira.

[1] Jabarti, vii, 78–80. [2] Jabarti, viii, 171 and 179–180. [3] Jabarti, viii, 300.